Florida Historical Quarterly
Volume 83
Number 2 Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume
83, Number 2

Article 4

2004

The Catholic Church, Martin Luther King Jr., and the March in St.
Augustine
Charles R. Gallagher

Part of the American Studies Commons, and the United States History Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida
Historical Quarterly by an authorized editor of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Gallagher, Charles R. (2004) "The Catholic Church, Martin Luther King Jr., and the March in St. Augustine,"
Florida Historical Quarterly: Vol. 83: No. 2, Article 4.
Available at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol83/iss2/4

Gallagher: The Catholic Church, Martin Luther King Jr., and the March in St.

The Catholic Church, Martin Luther King Jr.,
and the March in St. Augustine
by Charles R. Gallagher

I

n 1963 and 1964, Dr. Martin Luther KingJr. and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference selected St. Augustine,
Florida, as a target city for a new round of civil rights protests.
It marked the first major SCLC campaign since the Freedom Rides
and Birmingham demonstrations of 1961. In St. Augustine, local
chapters of the National Association of Colored People and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference labored to enlist local
Roman Catholics in the cause for civil rights, hoping that a cooperative relationship might help desegregate local businesses, civil
service agencies, and restaurants. As demonstrations in St.
Augustine developed, however, King's brand of social protest
began to test the ethics of both local church and civic leaders.
The St. Augustine case is useful since it reveals how King and
the SCLC attempted not only to include but to share responsibilities for negotiation of the civil rights crisis with Catholic leaders. It
also marked the first time that King protested segregation by petitioning a Catholic bishop to resign from a position of civic responsibility. In the St. Augustine case, a complex combination of
theological, ethnic, and political variables combined to suppress
full Catholic participation in the local civil rights movement.

Charles R Gallagher is a visiting assistant professor of history at the College of the
Holy Cross, Worcester, Mass. He thanks Rw. Frank M. Mouch for his recollections.
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During the 1960s, St. Augustine was an "intractably racist
town," in the words of Andrew Young; and while not a major
Southern metropolis, it was an attractive venue for protest because
the city was about to celebrate its four hundredth anniversary.'
Highly publicized memorial ceremonies were expected to draw
international media attention. In April of 1963, President Lyndon
Johnson named an eleven-member (all-white) committee of dignitaries to oversee the festivities. Among others, the Anniversary
Committee included auto magnate Henry Ford 11, international
financierJ. Peter Grace, Florida Senator George Smathers, and St.
Augustine's local Roman Catholic leader, Archbishop Joseph P.
Hurley.
Hurley's appointment illustrated a level of respect that
Catholics enjoyed both in St. Augustine and throughout the
state, respect that could be parlayed into civic authority. During
the civil rights struggle of the early 1960s, such authority proved
crucial for Catholics. Cyprian Davis, the premier historian of the
African American Catholic experience, remarked that local bishops were in a primary position to align the Church with the spirit
of the civil rights struggle. By duty of their office, bishops were
tasked "to preach and teach and to recall the principles of the
Gospel in order to create a climate where concerted action was
possible
King's non-violent style of social action first appeared in St.
Augustine during the summer of 1963. On 18July, more than a
month before the March on Washington where King delivered his
famous "I Have a Dreamn speech, picketing and sit-ins began at St.
Augustine's downtown lunch counters. During the protests, most
local Protestant clergy "steered clear of any involvement in the civil
rights struggle.m3The absence of a reputable moral voice allowed
darker forces to take center stage.
Throughout the summer, local segregationists and regional
Ku Klux Klansmen clashed with NAACP picketers. Klan affiliates
such as "Hoss" Manucy and his Ancient City Hunting Club beat
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and harassed SCLC and NAACP members throughout the year.
Once likened to a character from the popular 1960s Western television show "Rawhide," Manucy was an aggressive segregationist.
We're better organized than the niggers are, and the niggers
know it," he once crowed to the press. When asked about alleged
ties to the Ku Klux Klan, he scoffed that while the Klan was a "wonPublished by STARS, 2004
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derful organization," he was never a member. "Besides who ever
heard of a Catholic being a Klansman anyhow?"4
Manucy and others incited new levels of violence as the marches proceeded. King later described St. Augustine as "the most lawless city I have ever been in." Indeed, St. Augustine was the place
where King first presaged that his own death might be a consequence of the struggle for desegregation. Andrew Young remembered St. Augustine as "the SCLC's most violent and bloody
campaign." The dubious security situation further incensed King
to the point that he considered a full-scale march on the White
House to protest the lack of police protection for SCLC and
NAACP demonstrator^.^ During the initial stages of the demonstrations, however, battles were more rhetorical than physical.
In late March of 1964, Mrs. Malcolm Peabody, the 72-year-old
mother of Massachusetts Governor Endicott Peabody, was arrested
at a St. Augustine sit-in by Sheriff L.O. Davis. The incident
amounted to no more than an exchange of philosophies at the
Ponce de Leon Motor Lodge and the strong suggestion by Davis
that Peabody accompany him to the St. Augustine lockup.
Though lacking in drama, the notoriety generated from the booking of a Boston Brahmin prompted reporters to set up camp in St.
Augustine for the summer. Not long after her arrest, Peabody
appeared on NBC's Today show claiming that "St. Augustine was a
town festering in violence and hate."6
The Peabody arrest prompted an unusual move against
Archbishop Hurley, A week after his own arrest in St. Augustine,
civil rights activist and Yale University chaplain William Sloane
Coffin published a lengthy letter in the New Yolk T i m headlined
"St. Augustine's Racism." From out of the blue, Coffin called for
"Archbishop Hurley to publicly resign from the 400th Anniversary
Commission," claiming it "immoral" for Hurley "to plead the
splendors of the past in order to ignore the crisis in the present."
He asked the bishop "to assert solidarity with those whose dignity
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you preach."7 In Catholic clerical circles, that a lay person and a
non-Catholic at that called publicly for Hurley's resignation from
the commission was the height of brazenness.
Coffin's unprovoked and highly visible thrashing of local
Catholic leadership put relations between the Roman Catholic
Church and SCLC officials on shaky ground just as demonstrations
were heating up. Weeks later, J. Francis Pohlaus, lawyer for the
Washington branch of the NAACP, repeated Coffin's warning.
Writing privately, he suggested that Hurley distance himself Erom
the 400th Anniversary Committee since the festivities would "spotlight a four hundred year failure to implement the principles of
Still chaffing at the national expodemocracy and Chri~tianity."~
sure of the Coffin letter, Hurley declined to respond.
Coffin's awkward first step proved unfortunate in trying to get
Catholics involved with the SCLC's St. Augustine action. Historian
David R. Colburn suggested that "more than any other church, the
Catholic church had the greatest opportunity to influence the
racial response of the community." Early on, King deemed
Catholic support for the civil rights struggle crucial because St.
Augustine was the only Florida city-and one of the only cities in
the entire South-that possessed a majority Catholic population.
Andrew Young, King's personal assistant and leader of the St.
Augustine marches, recognized the potential for good that the
Catholic Church could bring to bear. "In as Catholic an area as St.
Augustine," Young noted at-the time, "the Church could be a big
infl~ence."~
Before 1963, however, the SCLC had very little experience in
dealing with Catholics. Since the early 1950s, the SCLC's strongest
link to religious organizations was the National Council of

7. William S. Coffin Jr. to the editor, New Yotk T i m , 9 April 1964.
8.

3.

J. Francis Pohlhaus to Joseph P. Hurley, 9 May 1963, Archbishop Joseph P.
Hurley Papers, St. Augustine Anniversary file, Archives of the Diocese of St.
Augustine, Jacksonville, Fla. (hereafter ADSA). Perhaps sensing that Hurley
might eschew a letter from an African American organization, Pohlhaus had
the letter delivered to Hurley through the good offices of Conrad Wirth,
Director of the National Park Service and one of the original members of the
anniversary committee.
Colburn, Racial Change, 159; NCCIJ memorandum,Jack [ S i o n ] to Matthew
[Ahmann], 9 June 1964, National Catholic Conference for InterracialJustice
Papers, box 3, St. Augustine file, Archives of Marquette University,
Milwaukee, Wis. (hereafter MUA) .
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Churches.l0 Since 1950, the Roman Catholic Church eschewed
being regarded as a "church among churchesnand refused to join
the NCC until December of 1963,when it was granted observer status. Consequently, during the planning stages for St. Augustine,
the SCLC was left flat-footed in approaching Catholics and began
to look hastily for ways to bring them into Florida's civil rights
movement.
King assigned Young the uphill task of aligning Catholic influence behind the objectives of the SCLC. Young, in turn, commissioned the Chicago-based National Catholic Conference for
InterracialJustice to sound out Archbishop Hurley on civil rights.
Between 1960 and 1968, the NCCIJ functioned as the national
clearinghouse and public relations organization for Catholic participation in the civil rights movement. Matthew Ahmann, the
council's Executive Director, called the NCCIJ's mission "the
removal of racial discrimination in the Church and our relevant
witness to the equality of all men in contemporary society." In
1963, the NCCIJ helped to prepare and support King's historic
1963 March on Washington.ll Yet, since the NCCIJ was comprised
mainly of laymen and women, it faced a tough battle in lining-up
the full public support of many U.S. bishops.
The NCCIJ was not officially tied to the institutional church
and could not claim sponsorship by the bishops. Certain bishops
favored the NCCIJ, while others were exceedingly wary of the
organization. Cardinal Francis Spellman of New York, for example, gave permission for Catholics to join the March on
Washington in August of 1963, but only if the march were "carried
out in a peaceful mannern and undertaken "as a last resort." In
gearing up for the march, Spellman sidestepped the NCCIJ entirely and encouraged his flock to work through his own diocesancontrolled Catholic Interracial Council of ~ e York.12
w
Try as it might,
the NCCIJ could not convince any U.S. bishop to sit on its board

10. Jeff Woods, Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregaticm and Anti-Communism in the
South, 1948-1968 (Baton Rouge, La., 2004), 118.
11. John T. McGreevey, "Racial Justice and the People of God: The Second
Vatican Council, the Civil Rights Movement, and American Catholics,"
Religion and American Culture 4 (summer 1994): 224; Martin Zielinski, "1963
March on Washington and Catholic Participation," Chicago Studies 42 (summer 2003) : 153-62.
12. "Church to Enlist Catholics Here For Capital Civil Rights Rally," Nau Ymk
Times, 11 August 1963.
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of directors. Almost by default, the NCCJJ named Peace Corps
director R Sargent Shriver Jr. as its national chairman in 1963.
Nevertheless, spotty approval from the bishops did not stop the
NCCIJ and its zealous operatives from attempting to organize a
grass-roots campaign in St. Augustine.
In April of 1964, NCCIJ Southern Field Director Henry
Cabirac went to Florida to enlist Archbishop Hurley in the fight for
civil rights by endorsing "cooperation between business, civic, and
religious leaders to promote positive statements and programs for
desegregation."13 Cabirac intended to persuade Hurley to support
the local NAACP in desegregating St. Augustine's hotels, restaurants. and city agencies. A bi-racial committee would negotiate the
demands, but the Archbishop was not receptive.
"All Catholic facilities have been quietly desegregated,"
Hurley instructed an underling to report to Cabirac, emphasizing
that the diocese was "extremely concerned about peaceful
progress in order to present a good image for the 400th anniversaV."l4 To Cabirac's surprise, Hurley ordered priests to have nothing to do with the NCCIJ, apparently considering the organization
"a trouble-making organization." Low-level diocesan officials were
instructed to tell NCCIJ workers that the diocese had a "long-range
plan" for desegregation and wished to "work quietly and behind
the scenes" for racial change.15
13. Memorandum, Rev. Frank M. Mouch to ArchbishopJoseph P. Hurley, 8 April
1964, Civil Rights file, Hurley Papers, ADSA.
14. Report, Visit to St. Augustine," Henry Cabirac to Matthew Ahmann, 1 April
1964, NCCIJ Records, box 3, St. Augustine file, MUA; "Negroes Enrolled In
St. Augustine," The Catholic Vnginian (Richmond), 4 September 1964, St.
Augustine Clippings File, St. Joseph Society of the Sacred Heart Josephite
Archives, Baltimore, Md. The reporting of full integration to the NCCIJ in
April of 1964 was premature. In a May 1966 letter, Hurley encouraged all his
priests to "make a greater effort to get colored children into our schools." He
stated plainly that priests "would probably have to personally invite [AfricanAmerican children] to come to your school next year" [1967]; see Hurley,
quoted in Superintendent of Catholic Schools, Circular Letter to Priests of
the Diocese, 4 May 1966, ADSk
15. Report, Jack P. Sisson to Matthew Ahmann, 6 August 1964; Henry Cabirac to
Rev. Frank M. Mouch, 6 April 1964, both in NCCIJ Records, box 3, St.
Augustine file, MUA;Jack P. Sisson to Joseph P. Hurley, 29 June 1964, Hurley
Administration Civil Rights files, ADSA. In early July 1963, the NCCIJ was at
the center of a controversy surrounding their approval of Chicago nuns in full
habit who picketed a segregated Catholic women's club. Besides smacking of
Catholic disunity, some church leaders believed the sight of nuns on the picket line brought "a loss of dignity;" Austin C. Wehrwein, "Two Catholic Leaders
Back Clergy On Plans to Join Rights March," New York Times, 11July 1963.
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Taking the diocese at its word about working behind the
scenes, Andrew Young then told the NCCIJ that he "would very
much like to see if we could encourage the Church to play a mediation role" between the local NAACP chapter and city authorities-an overture which, in hindsight, bespeaks a monumental
missed opportunity for the promotion of racial justice on the part
of the local Catholic church. The Archbishop resisted constructively cooperating with the NCCIJ, and movement leadership
remained bewildered about "how to get to Hurley." Indeed, resistance of Catholic leaders seemed pervasive in the small seaside
town. One NCCIJ worker wrote in exasperation that he "felt completely stymied in trying to get a lead on even one 'man of good
will' either in the Catholic community or otherwise."16
As their frustration mounted, NCCIJ workers began to suspect
that Archbishop Hurley was unfriendly to their interests. In fact,
during his time as bishop, Hurley exhibited many traits common
to Jim Crow America. As a young priest presiding at Mass in 1929,
he referred to the altar-servers, who happened to be people of
color, as "eight little pickaninies" who "smelled to high heaven."
In 1945, he gave his thoughts on African American involvement in
the labor movement in a "Confidential Questionnaire on
Communism" supplied by Father John F. Cronin of the Catholic
University of America, who acted at the behest of Federal Bureau
of Investigation director J. Edgar Hoover. Hurley's answers
showed a penchant for stereotyping. He offered comments on the
labor situation, noting that "Communist leaders among the
Negroes in the South are careful not to cause any outbursts of
racial feeling. They seem to follow the line of indoctrinating their
charges while still insisting that they continue to act as good
Southern ~ a r k i e s . " ~ ~
16. Jack Sisson to Matthew Ahmann [telegram], 9 June 1964; Jack Sisson, undated personal notes, NCCIJ Records, box 3; memorandum, Jack Sisson to Matt
[Matthew Ahmann], 6 August 1964, NCCIJ Records, box 3, all in St.
Augustine file, MUA It is apparent that King desired a religious leader to
play the role of mediator in St. Augustine. After all approaches to Hurley
failed, King petitioned Boston University theologian Harold L. DeWolf to act
as arbitrator.
17. Joseph P. Hurley to "Bud" Walsh, 1929;Joseph P. Hurley to John F. Cronin,
Confidential Questionnaire on Communism, both in ArchbishopJoseph P.
Hurley Papers, box 110, file C, ADSA. Hurley also identified Florida senator
Claude Pepper and Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings
as communist sympathizers. Hurley's response to Cronin is published in
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By the early 1960s, Hurley's position on African American civil
rights continued to be anchored in the Jim Crow, "good Southern
Darkie" stereotype. When King, Young, and the SCLC descended
on St. Augustine to force action in the summer of 1964, they challenged Hurley's preconceptions.
As Hurley resisted the SCLC's overtures, violence escalated.
Thirty consecutive days of sit-ins, swim-ins, prayer-ins, and evening
marches made national television news. On 9June, Andrew Young
was kicked, beaten, and whacked bloody with a blackjack while TV
cameras rolled. The next day, after Klansmen attacked a group of
SCLC workers preparing for a sit-in, King cabled Washington
insisting that the "reign of terror cannot be stopped short of intervention by the Federal Government."18 On 11 June, King was
arrested in St. Augustine.
While federal officials dawdled about how to respond to
the SCLC's plea, King decided to sideline the NCCIJ and
personally appeal to Archbishop Hurley. Apparently under the
impression that the Archbishop would respond to a personal overture from a fellow Christian leader, King wrote a lengthy telegram
on the day of his arrest asking Hurley to use his leadership and
high standing in the community to work for change. Specifically,
King wrote that 'tvith hatred and violence reigning in America's
oldest city," the Archbishop should "use [his] good will and
influence as a member of the Anniversary Commission to unite the
forces of reason and humanity within the city to bring about a just
solution to the racial crisis." If that were not possible, the civil
rights leader recommended that Hurley "resign from the
Anniversary Commission as a moral protest against the evils of segregation." King told Hurley that he was "praying for his cooperation" and concluded his letter with a fraternal "faithfully
Hurley made no reply.
While the Archbishop remained silent, the SCLC forged
ahead with the demonstrations. Executive director Wyatt Tee
Walker drew-up a "Battle Plan" for St. Augustine that called for
even larger demonstrations, this time featuring Catholic clergy

Steven M. Avella and Elizabeth McKeown, eds., Public Voices: Catholics in the
Amaican Context (Maryknoll, N.Y.,1999), 237.
18. "Dr. King Requests U.S. Aid in Florida," Neu Ymk Times, 25 June 1964.
19. Martin Luther King Jr. to Joseph P. Hurley [telegram], 11 June 1964, Civil
Rights file, ADSA.
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and lay leaders.20 Executive Director Ahmann reported that
Andrew Young was "most anxious" to get Catholic clergy to come
to St. Augustine to demonstrate, promising "clerical, interfaith
demonstrations any time we can get the priests in." But Young,
who required all Catholic priests to wear their Roman collars while
demonstrating, knew little about Catholic procedure.21
"Getting priests in" was much more difficult than simply
unloading them from buses. During the early 1960s, internal
church law, or canon law, required that priests arriving from other
dioceses "present themselves at the Curia" to apprise the local bishop of their activities. This law was almost always kept as a courtesy
to the bishop, especially when extradiocesan priests intended to
act as so-called "public persons." Complicating the call for priestly and religious activism, a separate church law banned priests
from "partaking in, or helping in any manner, disturbances of public order."22 In addition, if "danger to life" emerged within the
context of public events, such demonstrations were considered
"immoral9'-a chilling assessment given that by late 1963 one murder already was associated with the St. Augustine protest. With so
many competing principles, one canonist simply stated that in case
of "internal troubles" within a state or diocese, "direction for political action rests, first and above all, with the hierarchy."23

20. Memorandum, "Suggested approach and chronology for St. Augustine,"
Wyatt Tee Walker to Martin Luther King, Jr., Martin Luther King Papers,
Series 1, King Library and Archives, Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Nonviolent Social Change, Atlanta, Georgia (hereafter KCA); memorandum,
Matthew Ahmann to Jack Sisson, 17June 1964, NCCIJ Records, St. Augustine
file, box 3, MUA. Matthew Ahmann indicated that Catholic influence in St.
Augustine suffered greatly because there were no Catholics included in the
spring protests with Mrs. Peabody.
21. Field report, Matthew Ahmann to John P. Sisson, 17June 1964,St. Augustine
file, box 3, NCCIJ Records, MUA; report, "Florida Spring Project,
Demonstrations in St. Augustine Florida," 21 March 1963, "Blacks: Civil
Rights" box, SCLC file 1, St. Augustine Historical Society Archives, St.
Augustine, Florida. According to Walker's schedule, King was to be arrested
jointly with other clergymen, but since Hurley banned his priests from the
protests, only Rev. Ralph Abernathy and Rev. Robert England of Boston
Universityjoined King.
22. Stanislaus Woywod, ed., h t i c a l Commcnta?y on the Code of Canon Law (New
York, 1945), 59, 575; Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Canon Law (Westminster,
Md., 1934), 119.
23. During the "Easter pushwof 1963, a white "night-rider"was murdered by shots
fired from the house of the local NAACP leader, Dr. Richard Hayling;
Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 317. On the evening of 29 October 1963, two
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Canon law placed the decision for Catholic cooperation with
the SCLC squarely in Hurley's court; and Hurley took church law
seriously. One associate recalled that on occasion "he even tied-up
provincial meetings of bishops with canonical questions." By early
June 1964, Hurley was deeply upset with the violence occurring in
the town squarejust steps away from his cathedral doors. Since he
believed that the SCLC demonstrations disturbed the public
order, he interpreted canon law as prohibiting him from coming
out on the side of the demonstrators. Frustrated with the spiral of
events, he privately told his diocesan staffto "refuse to cooperate
with anybody regarding the demonstration^."^^
King and Young failed to take into account the radical differences between Catholic protocol and Protestant government. The
congregational individualism elemental to Protestant churches
allowed spontaneous participation of clergy and a streamlined
decision-making process. It probably never dawned on the activist
ministers that intricacies of Roman Catholic canon law might
stymie Catholic participation. Young's inexperience in this regard
was evidenced on June 18 when he contacted the St. Augustine
chancery to arrange for a meeting between King and the
Archbishop.
Hurley delegated a junior member of his chancery staff to
meet with Young, but warned the priest to be "most cautious in his
discussion" since in the past the SCLC had "lied, manipulated, and
was not to be trusted."25 On the surface, discussions were cordial.
But in response to King's earlier telegram, Hurley ended any illusions that Young and King might have about Catholic inclusion. In
a two-page reply, he contrasted local Catholic prestige with what
Hurley took to be King's lawless behavior.
The archbishop stressed that his diocese had always "used its
influence consistently to achieve equaljustice under law." Further
emphasizing his belief that public demonstrations were unseemly,
Hurley noted that "Catholic efforts had been directed towards proAfrican American homes were strafed with shotgun fire, and the Harlem
Gardens nightclub was the target of a grenade attack. A U.S. Army demolitions team was dispatched to St. Augustine to disarm an unexploded grenade.
On the principles of pertuhtionibus p.blici in Roman Catholic canon law, see
canons 140 and 141 in Charles Augustine, A Commataly on the N m Code of
Canon Law (St. Louis, Mo., 1919), 92-95.
24. Rev. Frank M. Mouch e-mail message to author, 17 October 2003.
25. Ibid.
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Martin Luther King Jr., joined by Ralph Abernathy, in St. Augustine in 1964.
Courtesy of the Florida Photographic CoUection, Tallahassee.

moting peace and concord among people of different origins, and
to promote good will in the community." The common good, he
argued, would not be served by submitting to King's request for
him to step down from the 400th anniversary commission. "The
best interests of St. Augustine," he fired back, "would be served by
refraining from any act that would perpetuate ill will or hatred
among the people."26
Hurley's private telegram to King was never openly published
or announced. The Hurley telegram could also be viewed as a
dressingdown of King who, on the day he wrote his telegram, was
placed under arrest-an act that Hurley certainly viewed as a vie
lation "under the law" and of "good will in the community." Sides
seemed to be taking shape, pitting the SCLC's direct action tactics
against the Catholic impulse to allay civil unrest.
By lateJune of 1964, King, Young, and the NCCIJ still failed to
grasp the roots of Archbishop Hurley's unwillingness to speak out.
On 18June, the archbishop received a poignant letter from Yale
26. Joseph P. Hurley to Martin Luther King, Jr., in Rev. Irvine Nugent to Rev.
John P. Burns [copy], 18June 1964, Martin Luther King Jr. Papers, series 1,
box 20, file 41, KCA.
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trustee Ross Dixon that may have tipped the balance. Dixon pointedly asked Hurley to use his "influence as a private citizen to help
the Negroes of St. Augustine secure their human rights." "To me,"
Dixon concluded, "it is more important to do this than promote
tourism. Recent events make it even more important for the
Church to speak out forcefully. Either as a private citizen or a
spokesman for the church, I hope you will take a clear stand."*'
Although Hurley scratched "no answer" across the top of
Dixon's letter, it was not long afterward that he issued a response
to the crisis. As demonstrators filled the city, Hurley penned a letter urging Catholics to stay calm which was read from the pulpit of
St. Augustine's Cathedral by its pastor at all Masses on the weekend
of 25 June. The Archbishop recommended "that all Catholic people abstain from any actions which might occasion or increase disorder or strife or lawlessness in our city." The local newspaper
claimed that the letter was a call for Catholics to refrain from taking part in SCLC demonstrations, but in actuality it reflected no
more than what canon law allowed under the circumstance^.^^
Lay Catholics wrote to Hurley from around the diocese and the
nation decrying the Church's "do nothing-let's wait and see policy." Geraldine Stevens, an Afi-ican American Catholic from St.
Petersburg, wrote that she found it "embarrassing" to see Protestant
and Jewish clergy struggle for civil rights in St. Augustine "with no
similar move by the Catholic clergy." Echoing the sentiments of
King and Young, Stevens advised Hurley that "No voice in the City
of St. Augustine would command more respect than yours" and
asked Hurley to "please raise your voice on behalf of our Negro
people." In similar fashion, an indignant Bostonian wrote that
Catholics should be "appalled at the lack of action on the part of
local ministers4 wonder what they think Jesus thinks of their
27. Ross Dixon to the Most Reverend Joseph P. Hurley, 18 June 1964, Hurley
papers, "Race Question" file, ADSA. Ross Dixon was a founder and trustee of
Yale University's Yale in China campus. An Episcopalian at the time, he was
president of Ross Dixon and Associates, an education management consulting firm in New York City.
28. The Catholic Standard (Washington, D.C.) 26 June 1964; "Cathedral Cautions
Catholics," "Long Hot Summer, 1964" scrapbook, 32, Civil Disorders file,
SAHS. In some respects, "lawlessness" may have been an apt description of
the situation. A confidential FBI source quoted King as saying that the
evening of June 25 was "the wont night that they [the SCLC] had ever had,"
with over forty protesters beaten. King was reported to be "afraid someone
will be killed;" Kenneth O'Reilly, Black AmeriEam: T h FBI Files, ed. David
Gallen (New York, 1994),200.

Published by STARS, 2004

13

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 83 [2004], No. 2, Art. 4

behavior toward the Negroes?" Jack Sisson of the NCCIJ was also
mystified by diocesan intransigence and wired back to Chicago that
even though he "was a member of the power structure-the case
with Archbishop Hurley" was "hopeless at this time."29
Part of the problem emerging between the diocese and the
SCLC was that Catholic insistence on a "quiet" policy of racial justice and desegregation was diametrically opposed to the public
and often confrontational tactics espoused by King's special projects director and "field general," Hosea Williams." As perceived
by many, the "night march" merely heightened the risks, turnout,
and anger of the opposing forces. The already patent security hazards multiplied under cover of darkness, leading to the assumption
on the part of whites that Williams's embrace of the night march
was a deliberately incendialy maneuver.
The SCLC's decision to showcase their new "night march"
technique in a town so historically tied to Roman Catholicism as St.
Augustine could not have come at a worse time. Between 1955and
1965, southern Catholics were still trying to find their way on issues
of race, and many remained staunch segregationists. In 1958, the
U.S. Catholic bishops issued a groundbreaking statement identifying racism as sin, "a moral evil that denies human persons their
dignity as children of God." King called the declaration
"admirable," but warned the bishops that such public declarations
were "still too far and too few, and they move all too slowly down
to the local churches in actual practice," evidencing an inexplicable "schism" between Catholic theology and Catholic social
engagement at the parochial level. 31
By 1960, the schism generated increasingly tendentious
debates within the American Catholic church. Sharp divisions
emerged within the Catholic civil rights movement over "direct
29. Unknown to Joseph P. Hurley, 25 June 1964, Civil Rights file; Geraldine B.
Stevens to Joseph P. Hurley, 20 June 1964, Race Question file, both in ADSA;
J. Leroy Conel, "Second Open Letter to the Clergymen and Mayor of St.
Augustine," 25 July 1964, King Papers, series 1, box 20, file 43, KCA,NCCIJ
Memorandum,Jack Sisson to Irv Schulman, 28July 1964, NCCIJ Records, box
3, St. Augustine file, MUA.
30. Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The SCLC and Martin Luther
King&. (Athens, Ga., 1987), 182; David J. Garrow, ed., Martin LutkKing, Jr.:
Civil f i g h t s Leader, Tkologian, Orator, 3 vols. (New York, 1989), 1: 9.
31. Administrative Board, National Catholic Welfare Conference,
"Discrimination and the Christian Conscience," in Avella and McKeown eds.,
Public Voices, 2554; Martin Luther King Jr., A Testament of Hope: The Essential
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action" tactics such as Freedom Rides and sit-ins. The NCCJJ
endorsed the use of the sit-in as a legitimate form of Catholic
action at their inaugural convention in 1960, but the initiative
was bereft of episcopal support. Privately, Jesuit reformer
John LaFarge endorsed the tactics, but convinced neither the U.S.
bishops nor the influential Jesuit periodical A m ' c a to voice
approval. In as much as liberal Catholics like Father LaFarge
and the NCCIJ were inclined to endorse direct action methods,
they held little official clout with national Catholic leadership.
The real power to c l a w the issue was lay with the bishop's
conference in Washington, D.C. Known in 1964 as the National
Catholic Welfare Conference, the organization "was perceived
by the government and the public at large as the official voice of
the American bishops."32 After their 1958 letter, they neglected
to take an official stand on the issue of Catholic participation
in civil rights demonstrations, basically leaving it to each bishop
to plan action for his diocese. Consequently, ranging from diocese
to diocese, Catholics were split on the issue.33
This policy was evident two days before Hurley issued his
Cathedral letter banning Catholics from participating in the St.
Augustine demonstrations. King received a remarkable letter
from one of Hurley's suffragan bishops, Paul J. Hallinan of
Atlanta." Hallinan, part of a new breed of progressive bishops, virtually endorsed King's tactics, writing about the "complex and danWritings of Martin Luther King Jr., ed. James Melvin Washington (San
Francisco, 1986), 479.
32. David W. Southern, John LaFaqp and the Limits of Catholic Intewaciulism, 19111%3 (Baton Rouge, La., 1996),
Stephen J. Ochs, Desegngating the Altar:
The Josqhites and the struggle for B h k Aiests, 1871-1560 (Baton Rouge, La.,
1990), 307-9; Gerald P. Fogarty, "The Authority of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference," in Episcopal C o n f m : Historical, Canonical, and
Theological Studies, ed. Thomas J. Reese ( 1989), online, http://www.americamagazine.org/reese/ec/ec-3fogarty.html.
33. Catholic episcopal support for the March on Washington was emblematic of
the situation. In 1964, King praised by name the Churches of Christ of the
U.SA, the American Baptist Convention, the United Presbyterian Church, as
well as the Lutheran and Methodist churches for "fully, enthusiastically," and
"of5cially" endorsing the march. Since the NCWC did not endorse the march
officially King simply acknowledged the statements of Cardinal Spellman and
the activity of Richard Cardinal Cushing of Boston; Martin Luther King Jr.,
W h y We Can't Wait (New York, 1964), 135.
34. A suffragan is a bishop of equal rank within a cluster of adjacent dioceses in
a geographical region or province. On Hallinan and civil rights, see Thomas
J. Shelley, PaulJ. HaUinan: First Amhbbhop of Atlanta (Wilmington, Del., 1989),
98230.
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gerous situations" King faced in fighting for civil rights legislation.
"We have you to thank," Hallinan wrote approvingly, "for your
Christian witness, your courage, and your nobility." Hallinan
seemed convinced that emulation of King ought to be the proper
Catholic response. "The nation, white and Negro, owes you a trib
ute, not so much of acclamation (for the Christian is not too concerned about that), but of following you in the Christian virtues
that your life exemplifies." "History will pay that tribute, even
though it may be clouded today."J5 For many American bishops,
including Archbishop Hurley of St. Augustine, the clouded atmosphere of social turmoil obstructed a clear and uniform policy on
endorsing "direct action." Caution, circumspection, and avoidance were the watchwords for many bishops.
Privately, Hurley described his caution about endorsing the St.
Augustine march to young Catholic seminarian who wrote to him
from an Ohio. "His Grace is not convinced," a Hurley secretary
explained, "that the Chicago Methods are best suited to solve the
century-old problems of relations between the races." To Hurley,
the Chicago-based NCCIJ's methods were no more than rabblerousing. "We wish to avoid the spectacular, the tumultuous, highly publicized demonstrations which leave everybody in a highly
emotional state," he explained to a seminarian, "and which generate more hate and condemnation than they cure." In marked contrast to King's methods, "we avoid inflamed words, but we seek to
abound in many acts of justice and goodwill."36 Regardless of
Hurley's wish for peace and low-key acts of justice, the times were
anything but ordinary. The St. Augustine demonstrations evolved
from non-violent civil disobedience to low-grade civil unrest, and
this posed a thorny problem for Florida Catholics.
35. Paul J. Hallinan to Dr. and Mrs. Martin Luther King, 22 June 1964, Martin
Luther King Jr. Papers, series I, box 12, folder 17, KCA. Another instance of

division within the hierarchy arose when Hallinan sought audience for King
with Pope Paul VI in September 1964. Hallinan wrote to the Papal Secretary
of State at the Vatican that King was "a man of deep faith, great courage, and
high moral caliber." At the same time, the influential Francis Cardinal
Spellman of New York worked to undermine the proposed audience at the
behest of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, who thought that King was "a degenerate;" Paul J. Hallinan to Amleto G. Cardinal Cicognani, 4 September 1964,
Martin Luther King Jr. Papers, Series I, box 12, folder 17, KG% David J.
Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr.: Frm "Solo"to Memphis (New York,
1981), 121.
36. Hurley, quoted in Rev. Chancellor Inine Nugent to Steven Phelan, 5 May
1964, Civil Rights file, ADSA.
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While Hurley's hands were tied by Catholic canon law on the
issue of priestly participation in the demonstrations, so too were
they bound by Catholic theology in terms of Catholic public s u p
port for the marches. King's insistence on the participatory
Christian reconstruction of society clashed head-on with Roman
Catholic church-state theory grounded in the submission to civil
authorities. As the demonstrations in St. Augustine wound down,
King implored city fathers to acknowledge "that segregation is evil
and to take it upon themselves to rid St. Augustine of it," even if
that meant overturning local laws.37
For many Catholics, such a proposition was outrageous since,
in theological terms, civil law was "subordered" to divine law and
derivative of divine ordinance. Law-breaking was pregnant with
moral opprobrium precisely due to the mandate that civil law was
to approximate divine law as closely as possible. With King's forces
disrupting public order and encouraging arrest, it was difficult for
conservative Catholics to consider him a proper Christian, much
less a social prophet. When King exclaimed at the height of the
demonstrations that he wanted all St. Augustinians to join him, "if
necessary, in the St. John's County Jail," he cut to the core of
Catholic church-state submission.%
Hurley was baffled by King's philosophy of protest. "We consider bare legalities may be a delusion unless there is also good will
in the community," he replied. "Obey the law," he wrote in his
diary during the crisis of July, 1964. "Those who dislike the law
should go to the courts." "I'm for the Negro," he professed, "he is
a human being who has not yet been given his rights. He is looking for equality under the law. He has a right to fight for it. But
his hope is in the law. He defeats himself if he violates the law."39
Legalistic thinking was commonplace among early twentiethcentury U.S. Catholic bishops. Yet by the end of 1965, new waves
37. Paul Good, The Trouble I've &en: WhiteJmmlist/Blhck Movement (Washington,
D.C., 1975), 100.
38. Thomas T. Love, "The Two Principles of Roman Catholic Church-State
Relations,"E t h k 76 (October 1965): 58; David R Colburn, Racial Change and
Community Crisis: St. Augustine, J h i d u , 1877-1980 (NewYork, 1985), 95. For a
treatment of King as a socio-spiritual prophet, see Richard L. Deae, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Spirit-Led Pnghct: A Biography (NewYork, 2000);Cornel West,
The C m e l West Reader (New York, 1999), 35'7-59.
39. Joseph P. Hurley to Martin Luther King Jr. [telegram], 18 June 1964, Civil
Rights file; Personal Notebook, Hurley Administration Microfilm Collection,
reel 29, both in ADSA.
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of theological modernization began to upend such assessments.
During the Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church (196265), an updated theology emphasizing human rights and d e m e
cratic values was adopted. For Hurley, these changes were on the
near horizon, but during the "long, hot summer" of 1964, he
remained consigned to the old ways of thinking. King biographer
Taylor Branch described Hurley as recoiling "in genuine horror"
at the reforms of Vatican 1 1 . ~ ~
Church reform was not the only movement that held horrors
for Catholic bishops during the 1960s. International communism,
a bogeyman of fear for many post-war Catholics, began to meld
with public thinking on race issues. To Catholics, socially disrup
tive civil rights methods were often indistinguishable from communist-inspired tactics. Historian Michael Kazin has argued that,
during the Cold War, the U.S. Catholic Church 'constituted the
largest and best financed-as well as most uncompromising-battalion in the anticommunist movement."41 Many post-World War
I1 Catholics were convinced by Soviet moves in the predominantly
Catholic countries of Eastern Europe that "Godless communism"
needed to be rolled back. Catholic faith quickly merged with a
new patriotic Americanism based in anti-communist fervor.
Even progressive Catholics recognized that Catholic anticommunist religious symbolism had taken its toll on the civil rights
movement, particularly the public's association of the term "agitator" with creeping communism. "Many white southerners," the
NCCJJ opined in 1961, "believe that the new militancy of Negroes
is caused by Northern or outside agitators." While the progressive
NCCIJ regarded the characterization as "nonsense," it was d=cult
for mainstream Catholics to view the claim as false when just three
years earlier, the U.S. bishops "prayed" that conscientious
Americans would eventually "seize the mantle of leadership [on
race issues] from the agitator and the racist." Hurley was convinced that in St. Augustine "massive nonviolence would precipi40. Personal Notebook; Branch, RUar of Fire, 35. This characterization differs
greatly from that of another historian, who has written that Archbishop
Hurley was "quick to obey"Vatican mandates on liturgical reform; MichaelJ.
McNally, Catholic Parish Life m Rmi& s' Wwt Coast, 1860-1968 (St. Petersburg,
Fla., 1996), 339.
41. Michael Kazin, The Populist Pmuasion: An Ammkan Histmy (New York, 1995),
174; John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace? American CommunLm and
Anticommunism in the Cold War Era (Chicago, 1996), 95.
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tate a crisis of violence" on the part of whites. He believed that
King was fomenting violence deliberately in order to generate
media coverage and chart further progress for his movement.'*
Compounding matters for King in St. Augustine was
Archbishop Hurley's dread fear of communism. Just three years
after the march in St. Augustine, fellow Catholic, writer, and conservative luminary William F. Buckley Jr. eulogized the Florida
archbishop succinctly, pointing out that since "he knew its potential for eviln first-hand, Hurley ranked "among the most adamant
and outspoken critics of Communism in the United state^."^^ But
Hurley's antixommunist notoriety was unknown to civil rights
leadership, perhaps because much of his activity was carried out
behind-the-scenes.
From 1950 to 1965, the U.S. bishops released a series of public documents through the NCWC known as "persecution statements." These statements highlighted communist repression of
Catholicism worldwide and encouraged prayer for Catholics
behind the Iron Curtain. Unbeknownst to all but a handful of
powerful bishops, Hurley ghost-wrote all the NCWC's persecution
statements in which he often referred to communists as the "enemies of Christwand communism as the "new Barbarism." In St.
Augustine, local citizens clamored that "outside agitatorsn were
conducting the Freedom Rides, sit-ins, and marches. These were
trademark tactics of communist social disruption, methods Hurley
42. StephenJ. Wright, "The New Negro in the New South," in The New Negro, ed.
Matthew Ahmann (Notre Dame, Ind., 1961), 11; Hugh J. Nolan, ed., Pastoral
L&m of the Ammican Hierarchy (Huntington, Ind., 1971), 510. Hurley seems
to have been influenced on this score by a speech delivered in Congress by
Mississippi Senator John C. Stennis in April 1964, "The Civil Rights Bill-A
100 Billion $ Blackjack?," Hurley Papers, Civil Rights/Segregation file, ADSA.
Stennis failed to take a pru-civil rights stand during the 1960s; "A Tribute to
Senator John C. Stennis," John C. Stennis Institute of Government,
Mississippi State University, online, http://www.sig.msstate.edu/
mainpage.fwx?read=-ODNOYAI6C.
43. "Archbishop Joseph P. Hurley, RIP," National Review 19 (November 1967):
1251. In what amounted to a parallel career, Hurley compiled an impressive
record as a Vatican diplomat &om 1926 to1950. In October 1945, he was
named papal regent ad intm'rn to Yugoslavia. From Belgrade he chronicled
MarshallJosip Broz Tito's brutal repression of the Catholic Church. He experienced the murder of priests and beatings of bishops by communist thugs.
In 1946, Hurley was the target of a tear gas grenade attack while presiding at
Mass in Ljubljana; Report of T. J. Hohenthal, U.S. Consul (Zagreb) to
Secretary of State, 31 December 1946,Myron C. Taylor Papers, RG 59, box 28,
file 760.050, United States National Archives, Archives 11, College Park, Md.
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once described in a persecution statement as "calculated confusion."@
By the early 1960s, Hurley concluded that even Christian leaders such as King were susceptible to co-option by the communists.
"Above all," he wrote in an open letter to Florida Catholics "we
must be on guard against the wolves in sheep's clothing, against
that particular class of subversive who seeks to penetrate State and
Church under the guise of either patriotism or piety."45 Suspicion
of "subversive penetration," particularly under the pretext of piety,
reached its height exactly at the time of the St. Augustine demonstrations.
Revelations of King's purported communist *liations were
leaked to columnist Joseph Alsop in April 1964, while on Capital
Hill FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover testified to "Communist influence within the civil rights movement." Alsop suggested that longtime rumors of King's communist connections were "acquiring
some color of truth," and that King was "almost certainly still
accepting Communist collaboration and advice." In St. Augustine,
just days before King's arrest, the local newspaper ran an advertised series of articles entitled "Communism in the Civil Rights
Movement." Rev. Billy James Hargis, the ultraconservative Bible
sensationalist and founder of the Christian Crusade, sanctioned
such assertions in a series of lectures at St. Augustine concurrent
with the SCLC demonstrations. Eerily echoing Archbishop
Hurley, Hargis warned against "the danger of internal Communist
~ubversion."~~
While both the NAACP and the SCLC were aware of Hargis's
anticommunist bombast, they were completely unaware that
Hurley's thinking had begun to take similar shape. In a glaring

44. "Peter in Chains," in Nolan, ed., Pastoral Letters, 4'72; Hurley, typewritten draft
with handwritten corrections, ADSA.
45. Joseph P. Hurley to Pastors of the Diocese, The Rmida Catholic, 28 June 1960.
46. David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and the S o u t h Christian
Leudership C m f m (New York, 1986), 321-22; Joseph Alsop, "An Unhappy
Secret," Wmhington Post, 15 April 1964, "Right Wing Stirs Strife in Florida,"
N m Yonk T i m , 14 June 1964; 8 August, 1964. Hargis became preoccupied
with the threat that communism posed to Christianity shortly after his ordination to ministry in the Disciples of Christ in 1943. In 1953, he garnered
worldwide notoriety for a caper whereby he floated baskets of Bibles attached
to hot air balloons behind the Iron Curtain. He was one of the first public
figures to allege communist influence in the Civil Rights movement in
Unmasking Martin Luther King JF., The Deceivm (Tulsa, OMa., 1960).
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strategic misstep, the NCCIJ noticed that Hurley spent five years as
a Vatican diplomat in communist Yugoslavia and concluded that he
might be sympathetic to the "applied social justice" component of
communism. Tragically, they decided to ground their appeal to
Hurley for a meeting with King in terms of communal social justice
The move illustrates the vast disconnect between more lib
era1 Catholics who were in favor of civil disobedience and those of a
more conservative stripe who wished to maintain the status quo.
Only a handful of progressive Catholic bishops in the South
understood that integration was axiomatic for Christians, regardless of both canon law and communism. These minority bishops
knew the battle would be difficult. "I remember being almost
ostracized," Atlanta Archbishop Paul Hallinan wrote in 1963, "for
saying that the day would come when whites would look back and
earnestly wish that they had done business with Martin Luther
King."" Since Hallinan and others exercised no authority over
Catholics in St. Augustine, it would take the pressure of President
Lyndon B. Johnson to catalyze change.
The U.S. Civil Right Act of 1964 was signed within weeks of
King's arrest in St. Augustine. "It may be that we would not have
had a Civil Rights Act without St. Augustine," Andrew Young has
suggested, "if it hadn't provided a vivid reminder of the injustices
the bill was designed to address." In late June, King departed the
city with assurances from Governor Farris Bryant that a bi-racial
committee would monitor integration and civil rights. "It represented a degree of progress," King wrote shortly after saying goodbye to the Ancient City, "And I said to myself maybe St. Augustine
is now coming to terms with its cons~ience."~~

47. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Administrative
File, Subject File: Billy James Hargis, 1962-64 (Eethesda, Md., 1997), microfilm, Series B, reel 22; Jack S i o n , undated notes, NCClJ Records, box 3, St.

Augustine file, MUA.
48. Shelley, PaulJ HaUinan, 332 n 22. In the South, the bishops of the Atlanta

Province (excluding Archbishop Hurley) formulated their forward-thinking
uPentecostStatement" in June 1965. The statement flatly decried racial strife
and condemned racial discrimination as contrary to Christian thinking and
action; Archbishop Paul J. Hallinan, Bishop Vincent S. Waters, Bishop
Thomas J. McDonough, Bishop Coleman F. Carroll, Bishop Ernest L.
Unterkoefler, and Bishop Charles B. McLaughlin, The GeorgM BuUetin,online,
http://www.georgiabuIletin.org/local/l96/O3/b/,
49. Young, An Easy Burden, 297; Martin Luther King Jr., The Aukhgraphy 4
Martin L u t k King; Jf., ed. Clayborne Carson (NewYork, 1998),242.
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King's wish was difficult for some in St. Augustine to accept.
Even in the wake of the Civil Rights Act and legalized integration,
the city found it painful to move forward in good conscience.
On the fourth of July, some two hundred robed Klansmen
paraded through the town square, in front of St. Augustine's venerable cathedral. Six days later, a group of white segregationists
picketed the integrated motels and restaurants. Hurley's disap
proval of King's movement was manifested on 8 September 1965,
the 400th anniversary of the first Catholic Mass offered in the
United States. That morning, an integrated group of activists
picketed in front of the Cathedral. "We have always treated the
negroes as equals," the Archbishop wrote, still frustrated with
King's non-violent direct action tactics; "What offends them is that
some of them want special treatment, and some want us to treat
them as n i g g e r ~ . " ~ ~
There was no way that King could have been aware of ethnic
prejudice within the ranks of the Catholic episcopacy, in St.
Augustine or elsewhere in the United States. The march in St.
Augustine left him flustered about Catholic intentions. Coming
on the heels of Catholic participation in the March on
Washington, by the time he got to St. Augustine King was perhaps
too comfortable in thinking that "the social inertia and reaction
that beset so many Catholics" had been thrown off.51 S t Augustine
disabused him of that notion.
In late 1964, he publicly expressed his "humiliation at the failure of organized religion to support the cause of justice." While
addressing a closeddoor gathering of Chicago priests and nuns in
1965, he reportedly confessed that his harsh criticisms of the
"White Churches" in his famous "Letter from a Birmingham Jail"
were aimed at "priests and ministers" who "mouthed pious irrele-

50. Notebook, Hurley Administration Microfilm Collection, reel 29, ADSA. In
1965, sociologist of religion Alfred 0.Hero Jr. reported that Catholics from
northern industrial states who settled in north Florida for long periods of
time became susceptible to considering African Americans "naturallyinferior." Long-time northern settlers like Bishop Hurley were usually more conservative than their Protestant counterparts on issues of race, trade unions,
and world affairs. "Some former Northerners, Catholic and otherwise, have
become even more racist than most native white Southerners;" Alfred 0.
Hero,Jr. The S o u t h and World Aflairs (Baton Rouge, La., 1965), 457.
51. The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. Clayborne Carson, 14 vols. (Berkeley,
Calif., 1997), 3: 438.
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vancies while their brothers in Christ were ground into dust.n52
Presumably, since he singled-out priests in his remarks, King had
the tumultuous Florida experience in the back of his mind when
he voiced these frustrations to the audience. For King, St.
Augustine represented a valiant public attempt to harmonize
Catholic leadership with the Christian aims of the SCLC.
Fortunately, the sentiment of Catholic resistance evident in
St. Augustine began to fade in other parts of the South. In March
1965, the SCLC reached a breakthrough vis-i-vis Roman Catholic
participation in civil rights activities. The demonstrations at
Selma, Alabama, in March 1965 marked what Cyprian Davis called
an 'outpouring of priests and religiousnto march nonviolently 'at
the request of Martin Luther King,Jr." The contribution of priests
and nuns at Selma was "significant," according to one historian,
accounting for more than 15 percent of religious demonstrat~rs.~~
This was a decided shift from St. Augustine.
In his excellent study of Catholic participation at Selma, historian Gregory N. Hite called the efforts of the NCCJJ "both effective and precedent shattering." One of the overlooked "precedent
shattering" moves of the Selma mobilization was the extent to
which the SCLC and the NCCJJ effectively side-stepped local episcopal control of Catholic demonstrators. First, rather than
approach the Diocese of Mobile and its bishop, Thomas Joseph
Toolen, for permission to operate in the diocese, NCCIJ operatives
simply flew to Selma and opened up a temporary office to coordinate matters on their own. Second, instead of trying to recruit
local Catholics for the demonstrations-a tactic that Hurley's
order had undermined in St. Augustine-the NCCIJ arranged for
chartered aircraft to fly in demonstrators from Northern cities.
Another diversionary tactic employed by the NCCIJ at Selma was
that most clerical and religious demonstrators were drafted from
religious orders, college campus ministries, and seminaries-structures which were not directly linked to a bishop. Finally, there is

52. Rev. John Jones, "Priests, Sisters, and Martin Luther King," Community 25
(October 1965): 5.
53. Cyprian Davis, "God of Our Weary Years: Black Catholics in American
Catholic History,"in Taking Down Our Harps: Black Catholics in the United States,
ed. Diana L. Hayes and Cyprian Davis (Maryknoll, N.Y., 1998), 39; James F.
Findlay Jr., Church Pmpk in thc Strug&: The National Council of C h u r c h and the
Black Fnedom M m m t , 19561970 (New York, 1993), 57.
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some evidence to suggest that during the Selma march, civil rightsminded priests either ignored or ran evasive maneuvers around
obtaining Archbishop Toolen's permission.54
All of this activity indicates that, after St. Augustine, Catholic
activists were much more aware of the power the local bishop
could bring to bear in stifling Catholic participation in civil rights
marches. St. Augustine alerted Catholic lay activists as well as progressive priests and nuns that canon law, inflexible theology, and
the specter of communism created a climate of extreme caution
and disapproval on the part of some bishops. The experience in
St. Augustine emboldened Catholics to circumvent more conservative bishops and move ahead alongside King. While the opportunity for Catholic crisis mediation was not the same in Selma as it
was in St. Augustine, Selma ultimately signaled "that the Catholic
church was prepared to take its place among mainstream denominations as an equal partner in the struggle for social justice.* For
both progressive Catholics and Martin Luther King Jr., the elements of this transformation were shaped in St. Augustine.

54. Gregory Nelson Hite, "The Hottest Places in Hell: The Catholic Church and
Civil Rights in Selma, Alabama, 1937-1965"(Ph.D. diss.,University ofVirginia,
2002), 280-89.
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